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THE TENSION BETWEEN THE MATHEMATICAL AND METAPHYSICAL
STRANDS OF MAUPERTUIS’ PRINCIPLE OF LEAST ACTION
YANNICK VAN DEN ABBEEL1
1. Introduction
   In one of the most important twentieth-century textbooks of physics, Course
of Theoretical Physics, 1962 Nobel prize winner Lev Landau writes that his ex-
position «makes no use of the historical approach, [and that] from the very
beginning it is based on the most general principles: Galileo’s principle of re-
lativity, and Hamilton’s principle of least action».2 From these two principles
Landau aims to derive the whole of classical mechanics. Without doubt, the
principle of least action is a fundamental principle in classical mechanics. In
the twentieth century, the intuitions behind the principle of least action were
further generalized from classical to quantum mechanics3 and many other
domains in physics. Contemporary physicists, however, consider the PLA as
a purely mathematical principle – even an axiom which they cannot completely
justify. Such an account stands in sharp contrast with the historical meaning
of the principle of least action.
When the principle was introduced in the 1740s, by Pierre Louis
Maupertuis, its meaning was much more versatile. For Maupertuis the prin-
1 The author’s research is funded by a PhD Fellowship of the Research Foundation –
Flanders (FWO).
2 LANDAU & LIFSHITZ 1969, Preface, vii.
3 YOURGRUA, MANDELSTAM 1960.
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ciple of least action signified that nature is thrifty or economical in all its ac-
tions, i.e., that nature avoids to do anything unnecessary. Maupertuis under-
stood the principle in teleological terms and even considered the principle as
an expression of God’s wisdom4. It has been correctly pointed out by histori-
ans that Maupertuis in his later years moved towards a more speculative and
metaphysical approach, whereas his contemporary Euler and later Lagrange,
wanted to avoid such theological and metaphysical implications and frame
the PLA (in line with contemporary standards) in purely mathematical
terms.5
Such readings, however, have had the unintended side-effect that they
lose out of sight the question how the mathematical and metaphysical aspect
of the principle of least action fit together within Maupertuis’ own work. Invest-
igating if and how the mathematical and metaphysical aspects of the PLA are
compatible within Maupertuis’ thought will be the main goal of this paper.
In order to address this question properly it is necessary to first say a
few things about the complex and changing relationship between metaphys-
ics and physics during Maupertuis’ time. It is often assumed that with the
publication of Newton’s Principia physics immediately took a positivistic and
mathematical turn. However, the transition from natural philosophy to
modern physics did not occur overnight. The disentanglement of
4 Even though Maupertuis’ metaphysical and theological speculations on the PLA were
quickly ignored in the eighteenth century, the philosophical implications of the PLA re-
main open for discussion. Unfortunately, despite its growing importance in physics,
philosophers of science have been ignoring this topic for a long time. cf. STÖLTZNER 2003.
5 Euler did not really pursue the theological implications of the principle as such, but was
more interested in the mathematical exploration of the principle. Euler’s program in
mechanics, however, was not free from metaphysics and teleology. It was Lagrange
who, in the most radical way, purified mechanics from any metaphysics, theology and
teleology, and posited the principle of least action as a mathematical consequence of his
axiomatic principle of virtual velocities. 
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metaphysics and physics was a complex and gradual process that started to
take shape during the eighteenth century but was only completed in the
nineteenth century. The transitional nature of this process also explains
Maupertuis’ ambivalent attitude towards metaphysics throughout his career.6
In his early years, he was critical of speculative metaphysics and a priori
reasoning7 and favored the mathematical and empirical approach of
Newton.8 An important change in attitude occurred when Maupertuis moved
from Paris to Berlin. In 1740 Frederick the Great inherited the Prussian throne
and wanted to revitalize the academy of letters and sciences in order to rival
those of France and England9. Voltaire had endorsed Maupertuis as the new
president of the Prussian Academy of Sciences, and in 1746 Maupertuis took
up the position. As Mary Terrall (2002) discusses in more detail: before his
arrival the institution went through a series of structural changes. Its
6 The above biographical introduction is kept to a minimum. For a complete and detailed
overview of Maupertuis’ life and his scientific accomplishments, the reader is advised
to consult the excellent work of BEESON 1992, and the more recent book of TERRALL 2002.
Also the recent edited volume HECHT 1999 contains many relevant articles.
7 It must be pointed out that Maupertuis was not anti-metaphysics per se. Rather, his
point was that metaphysics should not be pursued independently of empirical research
or experience. In his early years he did not introduce a new metaphysical scheme but
reflected merely on those of others. For example, in his Discours sur les différentes figures
des astres (1732), which includes a chapter entitled Metaphysical discussion upon attraction,
Maupertuis argues that the notion of attraction does not logically contradict other prop-
erties of bodies and we can therefore on an a priori basis not dismiss it. The empirical
success of Newton’s gravitational theory was actually a strong argument not to reject it.
8 Understanding the dissemination of Newtonianism in France has been an important
topic in the literature. The work of BRUNET 1931 is mainly concerned with Maupertuis’
role as an advocate of Newton’s theories in France against a Cartesian establishment.
BEESON 1992 points out in his study that the dichotomy between Newtonianism and
Cartesianism is too simplistic and we must give proper due to the impact of Leibnizean-
ism as well. A different perspective which downplays the impact of Newton is pursued
b y SHANK 2004. Also his more recent book SHANK 2008 is of interest and includes a
chapter on The Invention of French Newtonianism: Maupertuis and Voltaire.
9 Cf. TERRALL 2002, 173-198, 231-269. Also her earlier article TERRALL 1990 discusses the
culture of science in Frederick the Great’s Berlin. Some other relevant articles which
provide context are AARSLEFF 1989 and CALINGER 1968.
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members were divided into four classes: experimental philosophy,
mathematics, speculative philosophy, and literature. It was the speculative
philosophy class which would provide Maupertuis with a new environment
and incentive to pursue his own metaphysical mechanics.10 Maupertuis,
however, wanted to find a middle way between the extremes of the
Leibnizian-Wolffian dogmatic philosophy and the French disgust of
metaphysics.11 In a letter to Bernoulli he wrote: 
German metaphysics is a strange science, but that is not the fault of metaphys-
ics, but rather of the Germans […] The French are too disgusted with metaphys-
ics; the Germans are too mired down in the mud. Perhaps the Swiss can find a
viable middle ground.12
Maupertuis wanted to reform metaphysics, and he thought this reform
needed to happen both on an institutional, philosophical and methodological
level.13 Terrall in her excellent book has explained in detail the story of
Maupertuis’ role in the Berlin Academy’s political organization. In the next
section we will show how Maupertuis’ discontent with the metaphysical ap-
10 Cf. TERRALL 2002, 237, 239, 270.
11 It seems a bit too strong to say that there was absolutely no interest in metaphysical is-
sues in France. Criticism of the notion of force as well as a more general criticism with
respect to causes and causal explanations was not uncommon (cf. the work of d’Alem-
bert), but this was hardly a French affair; we can find a similar criticism also elsewhere
in Europe. Furthermore, members of the Paris Academy of Sciences were participating
in the vis viva controversy and the question was even issued as one of the prize ques-
tions. Also figures such as Émilie du Châtelet are well-known for promoting a natural
philosophy that combines Newtonian physics with Leibnizian metaphysics. It is pos-
sible that Maupertuis was exaggerating the French context, because he might have con-
sidered his intellectual freedom too limited to pursue further his own (reformed) meta-
physical program in Paris.
12 Letter from Maupertuis to Johann II Bernoulli, 18 September 1747, cf. BERNOULLI 1747.
13 The new metaphysical method Maupertuis is looking for (contra his contemporaries) is
also the topic of LEDUC 2015. A somewhat broader story of the faith of metaphysics is
given by CLARK 1999.
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proaches of his contemporaries led him to pursue a new program in meta-
physics in which the PLA would play a central role.
2. The Development of the Principle of Least Action
   In this part of the paper we will proceed chronologically and discuss the
three most important texts related to the development of the PLA. In the first
subsection I will focus on Loi du repos des corps (1740) which shows Mauper-
tuis’ search for general mathematical principles in physics and his application
of the calculus to formulate physical problems in terms of minimal condi-
tions. The second subsection discusses the paper Accord des différentes lois de la
nature qui avoient jusqu’ici paru incompatibles (1744). Not only did Maupertuis
in this paper successfully unify the three laws of optics under one higher
principle, he also for the first time used teleological terms and even referred
to God’s wisdom. These speculative elements became more prominent in his
next paper, Les lois du mouvement et du repos, déduites d’un principe de
métaphysique (1746), in which he sees his principle as encompassing all natur-
al phenomena and providing an incontrovertible proof of God’s existence.
The history of the development of the principle of least action is very rich and
broad.14 In this section, I will limit myself to providing a genealogy which
14 A general overview can be found in the article JOURDAIN 1912 as well in the excellent
book of BEESON 1992. Commentators such as PANZA 1999 and PULTE 1987 provide a more
detailed and technical account of the mathematics at stake and also take into account
Euler who was key for the development of Maupertuis’ ideas. Others, such as GERHARDT
1898 and KABITZ 1913, have discussed the controversy with Samuel Koenig, who
claimed that Maupertuis had plagiarized Leibniz, the alleged true originator of the prin-
ciple of least action. Furthermore, as we already pointed out above, TERRALL 2002 is
sensitive to the political context and the more general culture of science. BOUDRI 2013, on
the other hand, has read the PLA with respect to the changing metaphysical conception
of force during the eighteenth century. Finally, FEHER 1988 focusses on the role of meta-
phor and analogy in the birth of the principle of least action. Providing a synopsis of
these different perspectives is not required for the purpose of this paper.
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highlights both the mathematical and metaphysical aspects of the PLA. Such
a developmental story will set the stage for the next section, where we will
ask to which extent these two aspects are compatible with each other in
Maupertuis’ own thinking.
2.1. Loi du repos des corps
   Maupertuis read to the Paris Academy on the 20th of February 1740 the pa-
per Loi du repos des corps in which he presents a new principle in statics. Be-
fore turning to a more technical discussion of this principle, he offers a reflec-
tion on the nature and types of principles in physics:
If the sciences are founded on certain simple and clear principles from the first
type, on which all the truths that are the object thereof depend, they have yet
other principles, less simple truthwise, and often difficult to discover, but which
once discovered, are of very great utility. These are in some way the laws which
Nature follows in certain combinations of circumstances, and which teach us
what she will do on similar occasions. The first principles hardly require any
demonstration by their evidence which is obvious to the mind as soon as it ex-
amines them. The principles of the second kind, however, do not have a rigor-
ous physical Demonstration, because it is impossible to go through all the cases
in which they take place.15
Maupertuis introduces a distinction between «clear and simple principles»
that «do not require any demonstration» and principles that are neither
simple nor generally proven, but that nevertheless, once discovered, can be
very useful in specific circumstances.16 Even though the latter cannot be
15 MAUPERTUIS 1740, 170.
16 Maupertuis twofold division is not unproblematic and one might wonder – given his
skepticism and critique of a priori rationalism – if he is really convinced that we can
have knowledge of principles of the first kind? LEDUC 2015 suggests they are ‘mathem-
atical axioms’. BEESON 1992 suggests they are fundamental metaphysical principles (e.g.
the principle of non-contradiction). TERRALL 2002 suggests they are physical axioms of
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demonstrated rigorously, they have inductive certainty.17 Maupertuis states
that physics will never be able to provide an a priori proof of these principles,
but that perhaps such a proof belongs to «some higher science» (« quelque
science supérieure »).18 These remarks are vague, but it is reasonable to align
them with his later attempts to provide a metaphysical justification for gener-
al principles in physics. In 1740 he does not pursue this further but only
points out that the certainty of principles of the second kind is so great that
some mathematicians do not hesitate to make them the foundations of their
theories. Maupertuis says that these principles are used every day to solve
problems and that they function as a «mental shortcut». Indeed, because «our
spirit, being a thing of limited scope, often finds that the distance from the
first principles to the point it aims at is too great, [it] tires or loses its way».19
Accordingly, these intermediate principles allow one to dispense with part of
the deductive chain and one «often finds that [once applied] the mind has but
a little way to go to reach [its] goal».20 Such shortcuts are particularly useful
in statics and dynamics, he says, where «the complicated way that force is
the mathematical sciences (e.g. Newton’s axiomata sive leges motus). The last interpreta-
tion has some credibility because in the text Maupertuis says that it would be too diffi-
cult to solve physical problems starting deductively from (physical?) principles of the
first kind. However, one might wonder to which extent first principles such as New-
ton’s laws of motion are ‘clear and simple’ and ‘do not require any demonstration’. 
17 « Jamais on n’a donné de Démonstration générale à la rigueur, de ces principes; mais ja-
mais personne, accoûtumé à juger dans les Sciences, et qui connaîtra la force de l’induc-
tion, ne doutera de leur vérité. Quand on aura vû que dans mille occasions la Nature
agit d’une certaine manière, il n’y a point d’homme de bon sens qui croye que dans la
mille-unième elle suivra d’autres loix ». (MAUPERTUIS 1740, 170); cf. also BOUDRI 2013,
146.
18 « Quant aux Démonstrations a priori de ces sortes de principes, il ne paroît pas que la





related to matter makes these refuges even more necessary».21 He mentions
the principle of the lowest center of gravity in statics, and the principle of the
conservation of living force in dynamics as examples of unproven but
practically useful principles. The main goal of the Loi du repos des corps is to
introduce a new principle to the mathematician’s toolbox, namely ‘the law of
rest’. This principle (roughly stated) expresses the conditions of equilibrium
for a system of bodies acted upon by any number of central forces which are
directly proportional to any integral power n of the distance to their centers.
Maupertuis writes each central force as Fi = fi · zn where the fi are constants
which express the ‘intensities’ of the respective forces and z is the distance to
the center. Having explained his terminology we can now turn to the
formulation of his principle.
Consider a system of bodies that weigh, or that are drawn towards centers by
forces which act on each separately as a power n with respect to their distances
to the centers. In order that all these bodies would remain at rest, the sum of the
products of each mass, by the intensity of its force, and by the power n + 1 of its
distance to the center of its force (which may be called Sum of the Forces of rest)
attains a Maximum or Minimum.22
In other words, for a system of bodies of which each is attracted to a center by
a force varying as the n-th power of the distance from that center, to remain
in equilibrium, it is necessary that the quantity
∑ mi⋅f i⋅zin+1
is a maximum or a minimum, where f is the intensity of the force which acts on
m, and z is the distance of the mass m from its center of force. This condition





Maupertuis proves this principle for two simple mechanical systems.23 The
first is a system with one degree of freedom24: a system consisting of a finite
number of masses which are rigidly linked to a fixed center and rotate in the
same plane. The second case is a system with two degrees of freedom in
which the configuration is similar to the first case, except that the rigid con-
nections are replaced with flexible connections in the form of non-elastic
cords, and the center can move freely. The mathematical details of Mauper-
tuis’ argument will not be outlined here. However, it is worth mentioning
that his proof ultimately relies on the principle of virtual work of Johann
Bernoulli.25 Even though his previous mentor, who supported him in his
mathematical training, used a slightly different terminology and represented
the equilibrium conditions in terms of a balance of forces multiplied by ele-
ments of distance (infinitesimal displacements), a closer investigation reveals
that Maupertuis’ law of rest was built on this principle. 
Maupertuis’ 1740 paper stirred very little interest during his time. From
a historical point of view, however, this paper is interesting because it shows
Maupertuis’ first step towards the explicit formulation of both the term and
the concept of the principle of least action. There are some striking similarit-
ies with his later thought. Most importantly, the law of rest is expressed as a
minimal or maximal condition – a key characteristic of the later mathematical
formulation of the principle of least action. Furthermore, Maupertuis’
23 Cf. BOUDRI 2013, 148 for a good outline and visualization of the two cases.
24 The notion ‘degrees of freedom’ belongs to the vocabulary of contemporary mechanics,
and refers to the number of independent parameters that determine the configuration of
a mechanical system.
25 For a broader discussion, see HIEBERT 1962, LINDT 1904, or the more recent discussion in
CAPECCHI 2012, 195-216.
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reflection on the nature and usefulness of principles in physics attests to his
search for new principles in physics. Finally, despite his critical attitude of
metaphysical speculation and a priori rationalism, he seems to leave the door
open for metaphysics when he says that the demonstration of intermediate
principles might be provided by ‘some higher science’. We must, however, be
careful not to read too much in his earlier work. There is no mention of
teleology or God at this stage, nor does Maupertuis have the ambition to
provide a very general principle which is applicable across the different
sciences (optics, dynamics, and statics). These developments will only appear
in the following years, starting with his paper on optics of 1744.
2.2. Accord des différentes lois de la nature qui avoient jusqu’ici paru incom-
patibles
   The first major breakthrough in the development of the PLA occurred in the
paper Accord des différentes lois de la nature qui avoient jusqu’ici paru incompa-
tibles (1744). In this paper, Maupertuis seeks a principle in the field of optics
from which the three laws of optics can be deduced. Maupertuis considers
the positions of Descartes and Newton26 to be unsatisfactory and argues that
an approach which uses metaphysical principles is preferable. He refers to
earlier attempts to explain the laws of optics by using metaphysical prin-
ciples, which he equates with «those laws to which Nature herself appears to
have been subjected by a higher intelligence which, in producing its effects,
26 Maupertuis’ view on the historical development of the conflicting theories of refraction
is based on Mairan’s 1732 study Suite des recherches physico-mathematiques sur la réflexion
des corps. Another important source of Maupertuis in this paper was Clairaut’s 1739 pa-
per Sur les explications Newtonienne & Cartésienne de la refraction de la lumière which con-
vinced Maupertuis of the Cartesian position that light moves more quickly in denser
media.
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causes nature always to act in the most simple way».27 It soon becomes clear
that Maupertuis is referring to Fermat’s principle of least time, which states that
the path taken by a ray of light between two points is the path that can be
travelled in the least time. Though Maupertuis was sympathetic to Fermat’s
effort to subsume the laws of optics under one general principle, he disagreed
with Fermat on a theoretical level. 
Fermat himself did not hesitate in believing that light travelled more easily and
more quickly in less dense media than in media of higher density […]. Never-
theless, Descartes advanced exactly the opposite, that light moves more quickly
in denser media and, although his [mechanical] reasoning was perhaps inad-
equate, his faults does not stem from his assumption about the speed of light.28
Maupertuis endorses the position of Descartes according to which light
moves more quickly in denser media. Today we know Fermat was actually
right and Descartes was wrong, but this point is not so important for my fur-
ther discussion. The more important point I want to discuss is how Mauper-
tuis developed an alternative to Fermat’s least-time principle:
After meditating deeply on this matter, I have contemplated whether light,
already abandoning the shortest way, which is that of a straight line, when
passing from one medium to another, could not also follow that of the shortest
time. Indeed, which preference must it have of time over space? Light cannot all
at once travel through the shortest way and through that of the shortest time.
Why would it rather travel by one of these paths than by the other? So light
does not follow either of them, but it takes the path that offers a more real ad-
vantage: the path light takes is that by which the quantity of action is the least.29
Maupertuis points out that there is no reason why light would prefer the
shortest time or distance and that the real expense (dépense) that nature seeks




to economize is the ‘quantity of action’, which he understands as follows: ac-
tion appears to be a measure of what is required to move a body from A to B
at a particular velocity and along a particular path. More generally, when a
particle changes its speed along its path, action becomes proportional «to the
sum of the distances, each multiplied by the velocity at which the body
passes through [these distances].»30 In a formula this becomes:
Action=∑ vi⋅∆ si
But how can Maupertuis derive from this principle the three laws of optics?
In his paper he only derives the third law of optics. But by way of introduc-
tion, I shall illustrate how the first laws of optics follows easily from his ac-
tion principle. The first law of optics states that light moves in a straight line in
a uniform medium. So how can we prove this? Since the ray of light does not
change its medium its velocity will remain constant. So the above expression
becomes: Action = v·∆s. Since v is constant, minimizing this expression re-
duces to minimizing the distance ∆s. But the shortest distance between any
two points (in Euclidean space) is given by a straight line. So we have derived
the first law of optics, i.e. light moves in straight lines. It must be pointed out
that in a homogeneous medium the action-principle is equivalent to the least-
time-principle of Fermat. The situation becomes different for the third law of
optics, which deals with refraction due to a change of transmission medium. I
will now outline Maupertuis’ proof of the third law.31 Consider the following
situation:
30 Ibid.
31 Maupertuis’ proof is given on p. 424. The above proof is the same in spirit, but adopts a
more modern formulation (using the notion of a derivative of a function, using equa-
tions instead of proportions). This modern perspective does not distort the argument,
but makes it easier for the reader to follow the proof. 
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where V and W are the respective velocities in the different media, which are
separated by the border CD. The principle of least action states that the fol-
lowing quantity should be minimal:
V⋅AR+W⋅BR=V⋅√AC 2+CR2+W⋅√BD2+RD2
Since RD=CD–CR, we have that RD2=CD2–2CD·CR+CR2 and the above equa-
tion becomes 
V⋅√AC2+CR2+W⋅√BD2+CD2−2 CD⋅CR+CR2
Since AC, BD and CD are constants, and we can take CR as the variable (since
R is the variable place where the light changes the medium), one can look
mathematically at the first derivative of the above function with respect to























Where W/V is a constant proportion, α is the angle between AR and the nor-
mal, and β is the angle between BR and the normal. This is then Maupertuis’
(reversed) version of Snell’s law. Maupertuis also provides a teleological in-
terpretation of the PLA in the concluding passages of his paper. Maupertuis
understood the PLA to mean that Nature is thrifty or economical in all its ac-
tions, i.e. that Nature aims not to do anything unnecessary or needless. This
interpretation clearly ascribes some form of teleology to Nature, which for
Maupertuis was moreover an expression of God’s wisdom. Maupertuis says
that
One cannot doubt that everything is regulated by a supreme Being, while he
has imprinted in matter forces which denoted power, has destined it to execute
effects that mark his wisdom. And the harmony between these two attributes
[i.e. power & wisdom] is so perfect, that undoubtedly all the effects of Nature
could be derived from each one taken separately. The first of these ways [i.e. fo-
cussing on the properties of material bodies and the causes of their physical ef-
fects] is the one most within our reach, but does not take us far. A second type
of ways [i.e. based on final causes] may lead us stray, since we do not know
enough of the goals of Nature and we can be mistaken about the quantity that
must be considered as the true expense of Nature in producing its effects.32
Even though Maupertuis says that it is more difficult to attain knowledge
about final causes, he does affirm that they are inherent to the natural world.
The basic idea in the above passage sounds very familiar.33 Leibniz also fam-
32 Ibid., 425-426.
33 HECHT 2001 discusses the relation between Leibniz’ concept of possible worlds and the
analysis of motion in eighteenth-century physics in more detail. It is important to point
out that the comparison between Leibniz and Maupertuis is our own. Maupertuis never
explicitly mentions his indebtedness to Leibniz. On the contrary, Maupertuis’ know-
ledge of the Leibnizian positions, as he himself claims, is quite poor until the end of the
1740s.
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ously claimed that all existent facts can be explained in two ways – through a
kingdom of power or efficient causes and through a kingdom of wisdom or
final causes.34 This double method, which provides a role for final causes in
physics, is stated explicitly in Leibniz’ controversial text Tentamen Ana-
gogicum, where he refers to the two ‘kingdoms’ which exist even in corporeal
nature and says that they
interpenetrate without confusing or interfering with each other - the realm of
power, according to which everything can be explained mechanically by effi-
cient causes when we have sufficiently penetrated into its interior, and the
realm of wisdom, according to which everything can be explained architecton-
ically, so to speak, or by final causes when we understand its ways suffi-
ciently.35 
Maupertuis, in a Leibnizian spirit, likewise saw his principle as affirmation of
God’s wisdom and the inherent teleology in nature. As TERRALL 2002 sum-
marizes: isolated mechanical interactions might appear ‘blind and necessary’,
but considered in a metaphysical context, they become part of «the designs of
the most enlightened and free Intelligence».36 
Maupertuis stressed the theological aspects more in the following years.
On 6 October 1746, he read a paper to the Berlin Academy entitled Sur les lois
du mouvement et du repos déduites des attributs de Dieu. The title of this paper is
somewhat misleading, because it suggests that Maupertuis intended to
provide an a priori proof of the laws of nature in the same manner as
Descartes deduced the laws of motion from the immutability of God.
Maupertuis was very critical of such a priori arguments. Probably, what he
34 Cf. HIRSCHMANN 1987.
35 LEIBNIZ 1890, Vol. 7, 273.
36 TERRALL 2002, 179.
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really meant to say was that divine wisdom reveals itself when we take the di-
mension of final causality in nature into account. It is probable that this was
one of Maupertuis’ reasons to change the title of the published version of his
paper into Les lois du mouvement et du repos, déduites d’un principe métaphysique.
2.3. Les lois du mouvement et du repos, déduites d’un principe de métaphy-
sique
   As was pointed out in the introduction, during his later years Maupertuis
adopted a more speculative attitude. The metaphysical and theological con-
sequences of his principle of least action became more important than the ac-
tual mathematics involved. This clearly emerges from his 1746 paper, which
opens with a critique of the arguments from design or, as he calls it, «the
proofs of God’s existence drawn from the marvels of nature».37 Maupertuis’s
criticisms are quite elaborate and I will not go through all of them. 
His first and most serious opponent is Newton, who in the Opticks38
claimed that the uniform motion of the planets reveals an Intelligent Design-
er. Maupertuis says that even though it is «extremely improbable that the six
planets would move as they do»39 the probability is not zero. The uniformity
of planetary motion is not a necessary proof of an Intelligent Designer because
it might be the result of pure chance. Maupertuis adds a second argument and
says that if we were able to acquire a better knowledge of the cause of gravity
and how it operates, we would no longer need to resort to God. He refers to
the Cartesians for whom a certain «fluid transports the planets or at least
37 The full title of the first section of his paper is Assessment of the Proofs of God’s Existence
that are Based on the Marvels of Nature.
38 Newton, Opticks, 1717/1718, Third Book, Query 28, p 344-45, Query 31, p 377-378.
39 MAUPERTUIS 1746, 270-271.
71
regulates their motion»40 and suggests that if we would have an explanation
of this kind, invoking God becomes superfluous. Maupertuis did not actually
present a physical causal explanation for gravity, but his point merely seems
to be that lack of knowledge does not warrant us to posit a necessary connection
between the planetary orbits and God’s wisdom. 
Maupertuis next attacks Newton’s design arguments with respect to
living beings. Maupertuis rejects the claim that God perfectly designed the
organs of animals, and again suggest that chance might have «produced a
countless number of individual animals, of which a few were constructed so
that they could meet their own needs»41 and a vast number of other individu-
al animals «perished since their parts were not suitable for survival».42 Nature
is, furthermore, full of contradictory purposes.43 The naturalist might be per-
plexed by the wonders of divine providence at work in Nature when he ob-
serves the development of a fly or an ant (i.e. in the growing-process the egg
seals itself first in a chrysalis and then undergoes a metamorphosis). But,
Maupertuis sarcastically adds, these wonders only seem to produce an insect
that bothers human beings, will be eaten by a bird, or will get caught in a
spider’s web.44 Putting aside such contradictory purposes in nature, Mauper-
tuis admits that even though modern authors have acquired much more
knowledge about the finer details and marvels of Nature, these results re-
main a very weak argument for the existence of God. 




43 Maupertuis was well-versed in these areas and worked himself as naturalist, cf. Vénus
physique (1745) and the Système de la nature (1754).
44 Ibid., 274.
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gues that convincing proofs of God’s existence must be based on general laws
of nature, which are «founded on the attributes of a supreme Intelligence».
Maupertuis’ point is clear:
We should not seek the supreme Being in little details, in the parts of the uni-
verse of whose connections we know too little of; rather, we should seek Him in
universal phenomena that allow no exception and whose simplicity is entirely
exposed to our view.45
Even though the human mind cannot comprehend the totality of all natural
phenomena, mathematics is able to reveal an underlying order that coincid-
entally also reveals the divine wisdom.46 The mathematical approach in itself
is, of course, not new and many before Maupertuis exploited the power of
mathematics. Maupertuis’ key insight and innovation was to understand
mathematical extrema in teleological terms, such that mathematics became a step-
ping stone to reveal the wisdom of God. 
Before deducing the laws of collision (which are confirmed by experi-
ence), he briefly discusses the various debates on the nature and cause of mo-
tion47 which had led to an impasse. According to Maupertuis «a true philo-
sopher does not engage in vain disputes about the nature of motion; rather,
he wishes to know the laws by which it is distributed, conserved or des-
troyed, knowing that such laws are the basis for all natural philosophy».48
Maupertuis was not completely satisfied with some of the answers of his con-
temporaries. Leibniz’ claim that living force (vis viva) was conserved, for
45 Ibid., 277-278.
46 Cf. TERRALL 2002, 274-275.
47 Maupertuis briefly mentions questions such as whether motion exists at all, if force has
a physical reality, whether motion is an essential property of matter or not, and whether
we must make motion dependent on some prime mover or God.
48 MAUPERTUIS 1746, 283.
73
example, led some people to belief that truly inelastic hard bodies do not ex-
ist. Maupertuis rejected this position, arguing that the ultimate particles of
matter must be infinitely hard and inelastic. Rather than taking sides with
Descartes (and Newton) in the vis viva controversy, Maupertuis points out the
limitations of both Descartes’ conservation of quantity of motion (mv) and
Leibniz’ conservation of vis viva (mv2), which each apply only in certain situ-
ations. Maupertuis claims that he has discovered a new universal principle
which applies in all situation and is able to overcome the endless (metaphys-
ical) debates in mechanics.49 This universal principle is, of course, his own
principle of least action, 
a principle so wise and so worthy of the supreme Being, and to which Nature
appears to be constantly bound; which one observes not only in all changes, but
in its constancy it still tends to observe it. In the collision of bodies, motion is
distributed in such a way that the quantity of action is as small as possible, un-
der the supposition that the change has occurred. In rest, the bodies that tend
toward equilibrium have to be arranged in such a way that if they were to un-
dergo a small movement, the quantity of action would be smallest.50
Every change and constancy in nature, Maupertuis explains, has an action as-
sociated with it, which can be defined as the product of mass, velocity, and
distance. Maupertuis’ definition of the PLA is similar to the one given in his
optics paper51, though, in a strange twist, he suggests that we must actually
49 With feigned modesty Maupertuis says «After all the great men who have worked on
this matter, I almost dare not say that I have discovered the universal principle on
which all these laws are founded; which extends equally to hard bodies and elastic bod-
ies; on which the motion and rest of all corporeal substances depends». (MAUPERTUIS
1746, 286)
50 MAUPERTUIS 1746, 286
51 One of the theoretical aims in his previous work on optics was to subsume the three laws
of optics under one higher mathematical principle. In 1746 the PLA is mainly seen as a
cosmological-theological principle with physical-ontological content. His primary aim is
not to unify a multitude of theoretical knowledge, but to reveal a unifying principle ‘be-
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consider the distance travelled per unit time. As Beeson points out, «the
adoption of unit time is entirely arbitrary and unjustified by anything in the
nature of the problem. Maupertuis resorts to it only because it gives him a
convenient way to provide a quantity which he can identify».52 The
mathematical expression of the quantity of action thus becomes
Actioni=mi∆ vi∆ si=mi(∆ vi)
2
and when there are more bodies involved in nature’s change (i.e. in a colli-
sion) we need to take the sum of the respective action quantities as the price
which nature needs to pay to realize some change. I will not present all the
details of Maupertuis’ mathematical argument here. The main idea has not
changed. Maupertuis still maintains that «when a change occurs in Nature,
the quantity of action necessary for that change is as small as possible».53 In
the case of hard body collisions, he easily deduces54 that
m1(v1−v f )
2+m2(v f−v2)
2  m1 v1+m2 v2=m1 v f +m2 v f
which corresponds to the conservation of linear momentum. In the case of
elastic collisions he used the same technique to deduce the final velocities u1




m1 v1−m2 v1+2m2 v2
m1+m2
  u2=
2m1 v1−m1 v2+2m2 v2
m1+m2
which leads after some calculations55 to the conservation of kinetic energy
hind’ the diversity of natural phenomena.
52 BEESON 1992, 273.
53 MAUPERTUIS 1746, 286.
54 The symbol  signifies «by minimizing this expression we can deduce that»







In his third and final application of his principle Maupertuis seeks the point
about which two bodies remain in equilibrium. If L is the total length of the
lever and z is the distance of one mass to the fulcrum then the distance for the
other mass is L–z. Next he observes that when the lever rotates slightly, the
two masses describe geometrically similar arcs whose length is proportional
to their respective distance from the point of rotation. Because for Maupertuis
these arcs also represent their speeds per unit time, he can just apply a similar





With these three examples Maupertuis illustrates the strength and scope of
his principle, but he even expected it to have a wider application:
We may admire the applications of this principle in all phenomena: the move-
ment of animals, the growth of plants, the revolutions of the planets, all are con-
sequences of this principle. The spectacle of the universe seems all the more
grand and beautiful and worthy of its Author, when one considers that it is all
derived from a small number of laws laid down most wisely [that is, in accord-
ance with the PLA].56
At this stage of his career, Maupertuis did not pursue these other domains57
p. 273-276.
56 MAUPERTUIS 1746, 286-287.
57 Though he did not further develop his principle in other domains studying physical
reality, one might say that Maupertuis was doing something ‘similar’ in his later moral
philosophy where he introduced a calculus of pleasure and pain. In order to determine the
good life and measure human happiness, Maupertuis proposed to consider the amount
of pleasure and pain in terms of their intensity and duration. Taken together as a sum-
mation (over a whole life) this quantity should then be optimized in order to attain the
good life. Even though his idea lacks precision, we do recognize a vague resemblance to
the least-action principle.
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(though Euler tried to apply it to the revolutions of the planets). Even though
the principle of least action was Maupertuis’ greatest accomplishment, it was
only known to a limited audience. In order to make his ideas more known, he
combined some of his previous material in his Essai de cosmologie (1750) which
was meant for a broader audience.58
3. The compatibility of the mathematical and metaphysical aspects of the
PLA
   As has become clear from the previous discussion, the principle of least ac-
tion has a Janus-face. On the one hand Maupertuis calls it a principe métaphy-
sique, a fundamental principle directly dependent on the nature of God. On
the other hand, he regards the PLA as a mathematical principle from which cer-
tain laws of nature can be deduced. As pointed out in the beginning of this
paper, there is a certain tendency of commentators to prioritize the metaphys-
ical aspect of Maupertuis’ principle, and ascribe the proper mathematical for-
mulation of the principle to his contemporary Euler or Lagrange. Such a per-
spective, however, begs the question as to how the mathematical and meta-
physical ‘fit together’ in Maupertuis’ own thought.
BEESON 1992 was the first to point out an important conceptual tension
between the metaphysical and mathematical aspect of Maupertuis’ account of
the PLA. He remarks that in mathematical analysis one simply looks at zeroes
of the ‘derivative function’ which algebraically comes down to the manipula-
tion of symbols and solving an equation. But there is no mathematical reason
why this procedure should yield a minimum.59 Geometrically speaking, the
58 Cf. TERRALL 2012, 279 for a good discussion.
59 Whereas Maupertuis in his early work Loi du repos des corps (1740) speaks about minima
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points on the curve60 which satisfy this condition can be minima, maxima or
inflexion points – these are all points where a function momentarily stops
increasing or decreasing, i.e., where the first derivative is zero. From a purely
mathematical point of view there is no intrinsic connection between
extremum points and the human concept of economy. As Beeson puts it, in
mathematics «nothing is being saved, held back, kept in reserve for some
future application» and we should avoid interpreting «the quantities in
question in terms of daily human experience».61
In addition to the conceptual dissonance, there is also a tension between
the a priori and a posteriori status of the principle and the deductive link
Maupertuis unconsciously seems to establish between the two levels. In his
1746 paper Les lois du mouvement et du repos, déduites d’un principe de métaphy-
sique, Maupertuis writes that:
I could have proceeded from the laws [of motion] given by mathematicians and
confirmed by experience and looked there for marks of God’s wisdom and
power. […] I believe it is more certain and more useful to deduce these laws
from the attributes of an all-powerful and all-wise being. If those that I find in
this way are the same as those observed in the universe, would this not be the
strongest proof that such a being exists and that he is the author of those laws?62
Maupertuis seems to suggest that the empirical-mathematical laws can be de-
duced from some a priori metaphysical-theological knowledge. However, we
see no traces of such a strict deduction in Maupertuis’ text63. One does find
and maxima (though, not about inflexion points), in his later work he only speaks about
minima (which suits his interpretation of the principle of least action).
60 The curve we talk about here is not the trajectory of a moving body, but the curve rep-
resenting the (equation of the) quantity of action. 
61 BEESON 1992, 220, 268.
62 MAUPERTUIS 1746, 305.
63 It is not completely clear if Maupertuis has in mind the contemporary meaning of de-
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such an approach in Descartes’ Principia philosophiae where the laws of motion
are deduced in a strict logical manner from God’s immutability. One might
wonder if Maupertuis really intended to deduce the laws from God’s two
attributes (his power and wisdom) or that he only meant to deduce the laws
of motion from the principle of least action which is, in a derivative sense, an
expression of God’s wisdom. Furthermore, one might wonder to which
extent the principle of least action is something we can really know a priori
(without relying on experience). Even though our understanding might have
a priori an intuitive grasp of the metaphysical principle of simplicity or
efficiency, Maupertuis for sure relied on experience to give the PLA its
precise and quantitative formulation. I argue that Maupertuis’ claim that we
have some kind of a priori knowledge of the attributes of God (i.e. his wisdom
qua wisdom) or the PLA (i.e. how this wisdom manifests itself in nature), and
that from this knowledge we can deduce subsequently the physical laws of
nature, is untenable. The mathematical expression depends on the nature of
each problem, whereas the metaphysical version is a general statement which
lacks determination. The difference between the universal and the particular,
between the a priori and a posteriori, was also noticed by Euler who remarked
that:
we are still very far from that degree of perfection where we are able to assign,
for each effect which nature produces the quantity of action which is the smal-
lest, and deduce it from the first principles of our knowledge; and that it will be
almost impossible to arrive at it unless we discover, for a great number of dif-
ferent cases, the formulas which become maximal or minimal.64
duction. Perhaps he only believes that the PLA can be confirmed in the laws of nature
with the help of both mathematics and observation. Admittedly, his terminology is
highly problematic.
64 Cf. the Appendix to EULER 1744.
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For Euler the fundamental question was how the various mathematical forms
of the principle, i.e. the formulas in statics referring to point masses and flu-
ids, the formula for the curvature of a rod, and the formulas in dynamics are
related to each other.65 Stimulated by his correspondence with Maupertuis,
Euler wanted to find a ‘general mathematical form’ behind the manifold of
physical problems. Maupertuis did not pursue this mathematical question,
and as pointed out above, his cosmological generalizations and theological
claims were made in an intuitive a priori manner.
A third tension between the mathematical and metaphysical aspect of
the PLA is provoked by the following passage of Maupertuis’ 1746 paper:
If it is true that the laws of motion and equilibrium are indeed absolutely neces-
sary consequences of the nature of matter, that proves all the more the perfec-
tion of the supreme Being. Everything is so arranged that the blind logic of
mathematics executes the will of the most enlightened and free Mind.66
One might wonder how the PLA can at the same time be a logical mathematic-
al necessity and an expression of the freedom of God. Maupertuis seems to make
this startling claim casually, but he had thought about the issue earlier in his
career. In 1732 Maupertuis meditated in the work Sur les loix de l’attraction in a
Leibnizian manner on Newton’s inverse-square law of attraction. Without
actually committing himself metaphysically – but always stating his reason-
ing conditionally – Maupertuis tried to understand God’s possible reasons for
choosing the particular form for the mathematical law:
If God had wished to establish a law of attraction in nature, why would this law
65 Cf. BOUDRI 2013, 164-167 for a brief discussion of this topic.
66 MAUPERTUIS 1746, 303.
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follow the proportion that it seems to follow? […] In the infinity of different re-
lations that seem to have an equal right to being at work in nature, was there
some reason to prefer one over another?67
Maupertuis, after some reflection, suggests that the geometrical properties of
the law can be associated with the criterion of uniformity. He notes that God
must have wanted symmetrical macroscopic bodies like spheres «to exhibit
the same property of attraction that characterized their smallest particles to
attract in the same proportion on all sides».68 After having established uni-
formity as a relevant criterion, Maupertuis remarks:
Once the metaphysical reason for preference was posited, mathematical neces-
sity excluded an infinite number of systems, in which there could not be agree-
ment of the same law in the parts and in the whole.69
This passage makes intelligible how the freedom of God is reconcilable with
the necessity of mathematics. In a quasi-Leibnizian manner, Maupertuis sug-
gests that God is said to first choose among an infinity of possible worlds,70
having a certain criterion in mind, namely, uniformity and symmetry of the
laws of nature. But once such a world is chosen or actualized, the logic of
mathematics determines the necessary form the laws of nature need to have. I
argue that Maupertuis could have repeated this same argument in 1750. If the
least action principle is indeed the expression of the free will and wisdom of
God, the necessary mathematical form embodied in minimizing the quantity
67 MAUPERTUIS 1732, 346–47.
68 Cf. TERRALL 2002, 80-81 for a more elaborate discussion.
69 Ibid., 347.
70 Whether Maupertuis would use the notion of possible worlds in exactly the same sense
as Leibniz (as a logically possible collection of interconnected events) is unclear. We do,
however, observe an important similarity here.
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of action do not contradict the free choice of God but instead realize his
choice and wisdom.71 
In the fourth and last point of this section, we look more closely at the
epistemological status of mathematical and metaphysical knowledge with re-
spect to Maupertuis’ skepticism and phenomenalism. It has been pointed out
that Maupertuis radicalized the thought of Locke and Berkeley in order to
counter the prevailing mechanistic and materialist philosophies.72 Maupertuis
claimed that we cannot have any certain knowledge of external objects – not
even what causes our sensations – and that all our knowledge is just an order-
ing of the content of our mind. Maupertuis’ skepticism and ‘ultra-phenomen-
alism’ (G. Tonelli), however, does not make him a relativist. In his 1756 paper
Examen philosophique de la preuve de l’existence de Dieu employee dans l’Essai de
cosmologie Maupertuis mentions the universal agreement among all men with
respect to the propositions of mathematics, and in the first part of this work,
Sur l’evidence & la certitude mathématique, he further elaborates on the demon-
strative certainty of mathematics and its relevance for physics. According to
Maupertuis, the certainty of mathematics is grounded in the homogeneity
and replicability73 of the elements with which the mathematician works (e.g.
71 This third point resolves the paradox in the above passage in ontological-modal terms
(how the world could have been or must have been). The necessity of mathematics can also
be addressed from an epistemological perspective (to which extent are mathematical
propositions contingent or necessary with respect to the knowing subject). This perspect-
ive will be taken up in the fourth point above. 
72 Cf. the monograph of TONELLI 1987. Also the article of GOSSMAN 1960 makes many inter-
esting points, especially on the role of mathematics in Maupertuis’ epistemology.
73 Cf. BEESON 1992 for a brief summary of this topic, i.e. «Mathematics deals with the
clearest possible ideas, those of number and extent. These ideas share two properties
distinguishing them from all others: one is that of being replicable, by which Mauper-
tuis means that they can take any degree, being multiplicable or divisible any number
of times; the other is that they alone are ideas that are supplied by more than one sense
(extent is perceived by means of both sight and touch, number by all the senses).
Maupertuis proposes that no other property is replicable (that is, quantifiable); those
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number and extension).74 However, mathematics is nothing more than a
system of signs, referring to the forms of our perception, and provides no
knowledge of (the nature of) external things, nor does it reflect some eternal
Platonic truths. The same argument also holds for any physical science which
bases itself on purely mathematical principles. Maupertuis says that if the
laws of movement could be deduced from the propositions of arithmetic and
geometry, they would be necessary laws, but only « du même genre de
nécessité » as mathematical propositions themselves.75 Hence, a purely
mathematical reading of the PLA might at best produces a ‘subjective
necessity’ within the human mind, but it cannot produce knowledge about
the external physical world. We can, however, ask ourselves to which extent
Maupertuis’ metaphysical interpretation of the PLA – given his epistemology
– is able to grasp physical reality.
In the Essai de cosmologie Maupertuis made the controversial claim that
«the laws of motion and equilibrium [and by implication also the PLA] are in-
deed absolutely necessary consequences of the nature of matter».76 The most
vigorous attack against this statement was that of Samuel Reimarus, who in
his 1754 book Die vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion argued that
the approach taken in Maupertuis’ Essai de cosmologie, instead of proving the
existence and wisdom of God, led to necessitarianism and Spinozism. In the
that seem so in fact possess sub-properties that are reducible to number or extent: for
example, variations in the ‘blueness’ of a colour reflect variations in the quantities of in-
digo it contains. All this gives mathematics its particular qualities of certainty and self-
evidence» (258)
74 « Dans les sciences mathématiques ou les objets, les nombres & l’étendue, sont exacte-
ment réplicables, on forme des résultats dont tout le monde convient; parce que c’est
sur des sujets qui sont pour tout le monde précisément les mêmes: on est encore plus
content de la manière dont soi-même on les conçoit; & c’est en cela que consiste l’évi-
dence & la certitude  » (MAUPERTUIS 1746, 399)
75 Cf. GOSSMAN 1960, 319.
76 MAUPERTUIS 1746, 303.
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second part of his Examen philosophique, which we already mentioned,
Maupertuis reconsidered some of his earlier statements and now says that we
cannot make any claims about whether or not the laws of motion or the least-
action principle are necessary properties of matter. This revised position
coincides with his agnosticism of twenty year before. In his earlier work
Discours sur les différentes figures des astres (1732) Maupertuis also addressed
the question whether or not gravity is a necessary property of matter. His
answer in 1756, with respect to the laws of motion or the PLA, is the same: we
are unable to make such modal claims. Maupertuis, nonetheless, suggests
that perhaps more knowledge about the nature of matter might show that
least action is a necessary consequence of the essence of matter. But he argues
that the same could be said of all known truths.77 In search for a way out of
this agnosticism, he proposes to present a history of the laws of mechanics.
He discusses a variety of authors (Leibniz, Newton, Malebranche, Descartes,
Huygens) and their respective experimental, metaphysical and mathematical
commitments. Maupertuis admired Huygens’ approach and following his
attitude he started to refer to his least-action principle as an empirical
hypothesis, «a law of nature supported by observational evidence rather than
by abstract mathematical reasoning».78 Taking these remarks in mind, during
the last years of his life, we might wonder to which extent the PLA should
still be called a metaphysical principle. As pointed out above, with
‘metaphysical’ Maupertuis does not mean a (metaphysical) claim about the
necessary properties of matter, but perhaps he uses the word in a theological
sense (i.e. concerned with the divine attributes). Beeson points out the
importance of such a theological reading with respect to Maupertuis’
77 MAUPERTUIS 1756, part II, article LXXI, 424 ; BEESON 1992, 260, f51
78 Cf. MAUPERTUIS 1756, Article LXIX, 423 ; BEESON 1992, 260.
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epistemology
man’s incapacity to know anything with any certainty by his own powers
brings him back into dependence on God. Yet, like the bedrock of certainty
Descartes sought under the shifting sands of doubt, so through the dark glass of
Maupertuis’s phenomenalism can be glimpsed the one incontrovertible source
of truth, God.79
It is possible that the principle of least action qua metaphysical-theological
principle was for Maupertuis a rare but proper foundation for our knowledge
about the fundamental nature of reality. This metaphysical knowledge is differ-
ent in nature from empirical knowledge (which consists of an ordering of our
sensations through language) and mathematical knowledge (which as we
stated above only has a subjective necessity in our minds).
4. Conclusion
   Whereas commentators either ignore or tend to take for granted the Janus-
face of the PLA, I have tried to clarify the intricate relationship between the
mathematical and metaphysical aspects of the principle. I have done so by
approaching the issue from four different perspectives. First of all, I pointed
out that on a purely conceptual level the mathematical and metaphysical in-
terpretation do not collapse, since the mathematics involved not only yields
minima, but also includes maxima and inflection points. Secondly, I dis-
cussed a tension between the a priori and a posteriori status of the principle.
On the one hand the principle is an a priori intuition of the greatest generality
but, on the other hand, its mathematical form depends on the nature of each
79 BEESON 1992, 160.
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physical problem and thus requires experience. Thirdly, on the level of mod-
ality, there prima facie seemed to be a tension between the necessity of mathem-
atics and the freedom of God, but I have suggested a way Maupertuis could
have replied to this tension. Finally, by looking more closely to Maupertuis’
epistemology another difference was revealed. Whereas mathematical know-
ledge only has a necessity restricted to the human mind, the metaphysical in-
terpretation seemed to have a privileged theological-epistemological status,
which for Maupertuis could possibly have been a way to break through the
veil of his own skepticism and phenomenalism, and gain knowledge about
the fundamental nature of external reality. To which extent Maupertuis was
aware of all these tensions, we can only guess, but I hope that the historical
perspective I have adopted has shed light on the complex interaction between
philosophy and mathematics in eighteenth-century science.
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